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Abstract 
Interpretative flexibility is a central concept of social constructivism in science and 
technology studies. We think this concept, as it exists, can and should be elabo-
rated. In this paper, we argue that interpretative flexibility can be traced back to 
three different forms of infinite regress: the regress of truth, the regress of useful-
ness, and the regress of relevance. Resulting from this analysis, we observe three 
different forms of interpretative flexibility. We will show that in controversies or 
debates concerning the meaning of certain scientific facts, technological artefacts or 
research approaches, concurrently or consecutively more than one of these differ-
ent forms of interpretative flexibility may play a part. With this reconceptualisation 
of interpretative flexibility, we hope to contribute to a more elaborate understand-
ing of the dynamics of the social construction of scientific facts and technological 
artefacts. 
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1 Introduction 
Interpretative flexibility is a central 
concept of social constructivism in 
science and technology studies. We 
think this concept, as it exists, can and 
should be elaborated. The basic as-
sumption of social constructivism is: 
The observed phenomenon “X need 
not have existed, or need not be at all 
as it is. X, or X as it is at present, is not 
determined by the nature of things; it 
is not inevitable” (Hacking 1999: 6). In 
science and technology studies, this 
basic assumption is applied to scien-
tific facts and technological artefacts. 
However, scientists and engineers do 
refer in a certain way to the “nature of 
things.” They do so by deducing scien-
tific facts from empirical observations 
or by developing technological arte-
facts for given purposes. Hence, social 
constructivist approaches in the study 
of science and technology rely on an 
additional assumption: also the em-
pirical observations and the purposes 
of technology scientists and engineers 
refer to, allow different interpretations 
to a certain degree. This is termed “in-
terpretative flexibility.” This is not to 
say that every empirical observation or 
assumed technological purpose will 
indeed be interpreted differently. More 
often than not, as a result of previous 
processes of social construction, one of 
the possible interpretations has be-
come widely accepted and will not be 
questioned by anybody. But where no 
such consensus has evolved and inter-
pretative flexibility still exists, argu-
ments become circular and lead into an 
infinite regress. In these cases, the 
scientific facts are questioned because 
the underlying empirical observations 
are subject to interpretative flexibility 
and the empirical observations are 
questioned because the related scien-
tific facts are subject to interpretative 
flexibility. The same holds for the rela-
tionship between technological arte-
facts and the purposes they shall serve. 
Our reconceptualisation of interpreta-
tive flexibility is based on the observa-
tion that this infinite regress is not 
always of the same kind. To the con-
trary, we see sufficiently clear-cut dif-
ferences between three kinds of infinite 
regress that can be derived from exist-
ing social constructivist research in 
science and technology. We call them 
the regress of truth, the regress of use-
fulness and the regress of relevance. 
Consequently, interpretative flexibility 
is not always of the same kind, too. In 
relation to the three different re-
gresses, we will introduce a distinction 
between three forms of interpretative 
flexibility (3FiF). Regarding the regress 
of truth and the interpretative flexibil-
ity concerning the truth of scientific 
findings, we will draw upon the Em-
pirical Programme of Relativism 
(EPOR) by Harry Collins. Trevor Pinch 
and Wiebe Bijker have applied the no-
tion of interpretative flexibility to the 
development of technological artefacts. 
However, in the framework of their 
Social Construction of Technology 
(SCOT) the concept of interpretative 
flexibility remains underspecified. In 
conceiving the underlying regress as a 
regress of usefulness and interpretative 
flexibility as concerning the usefulness 
of technological artefacts, we hope to 
overcome some of the major problems 
of this approach. The notion of a re-
gress of relevance and of interpretative 
flexibility concerning the relevance of 
evaluation criteria to assess the future 
potential of scientific or technological 
approaches has been developed in an 
analysis of the Neuronal Networks 
controversy, which one of us has 
worked on (cf. Meyer 2004). 
We will show that the underlying re-
gress affects how interpretative flexi-
bility occurs, how different interpreta-
tions are negotiated, and how (if at all) 
a certain interpretation becomes 
widely accepted. In each of the three 
cases, interpretative flexibility consti-
tutes a different situation: either a 
situation of contested truth or a situa-
tion of contested usefulness or a situa-
tion of contested relevance. Thus, with 
our reconceptualisation of interpreta-
tive flexibility we hope to contribute to 
a better understanding of the different 
Meyer/Schulz-Schaeffer, Three Forms of Interpretative Flexibility 27 
 
meaning of interpretative flexibility 
within different situations of social 
construction of scientific facts and 
technological artefacts. 
In providing a differentiated view on 
interpretative flexibility, we do not 
only want to point out differences be-
tween the social construction of scien-
tific facts and of technological arte-
facts. Additionally, we assume that this 
view is useful for analyzing different 
meanings of interpretative flexibility 
within processes of establishing scien-
tific facts or technological artefacts. 
This is to say that interpretative flexi-
bility of scientific findings is not only a 
question of contested truth and inter-
pretative flexibility of technological 
artefacts is not only a question of con-
tested usefulness. Both can articulate 
questions of contested relevance. Fur-
thermore, interpretative flexibility of 
usefulness can influence the social 
construction of scientific facts and, 
inversely, controversies about truth 
can be part of the social construction of 
technological artefacts. This can al-
ready be shown in the “classical” case 
studies of the EPOR and of the SCOT. 
We will use the case studies of the 
gravitational waves controversy and of 
the development of the bicycle to illus-
trate our 3FIF concept.  
2 The Regress of Truth 
The basic assumption of the Empirical 
Programme of Relativism (EPOR) is 
that the natural world plays only a 
small or no role in the construction of 
scientific knowledge (cf. Collins 1981: 
3). The facts upon which scientific 
statements are based do not possess an 
inherent meaning. They have to be 
interpreted to become meaningful. 
Thus, they can in principal (but not 
necessarily in the practice of research), 
be interpreted in different ways. Since 
Collins’ main examples come from the 
realm of the natural sciences, espe-
cially physics, the subjects of possible 
interpretative flexibility are experi-
ments and the resulting data. How-
ever, in most cases, the potential inter-
pretative flexibility of experiments and 
their results does not occur in research 
practice, because the established scien-
tific state of the art allows for only one 
of these interpretations. In such a case, 
their meaning is undisputable. 
Experiments pupils carry out in school 
provide a simple example: the pupils’ 
task is to produce the proper result but 
the interpretation is not in question. 
However, in some cases experimental 
results cannot be explained with re-
course to undisputable knowledge. 
This is where interpretative flexibility 
becomes acute. When the results of an 
experiment and the existing scientific 
knowledge do not match, this can be 
explained in two different ways: either 
the experiment was implemented 
properly but the actual state of knowl-
edge fails to explain its results; or the 
experimental design was faulty, 
thereby producing false results which 
do not question the actual scientific 
 
Figure 1: Three Forms of Interpretative Flexibility 
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knowledge. In such a situation it is 
impossible to decide which one is the 
right explanation. An experiment is 
performed competently when it pro-
duces proper results. The aforemen-
tioned experiments in school illustrate 
this point: there, the proper results are 
known because they fit into uncon-
tested scientific knowledge. Thus the 
teacher has no problem in deciding 
whether or not a pupil has performed 
the experiment competently. What is 
important is that pupils demonstrate 
their ability to conduct experiments 
properly by getting the right results. 
However, when the existing scientific 
knowledge does not help to decide 
whether an experimental result is reli-
able, the attempt to prove scientific 
claims experimentally leads into an 
infinite regress: Whether the experi-
ment is implemented in a competent 
way or not can only be determined by 
the accuracy of the results. Yet, the 
decision about the results depends on 
the experiment and whether it is com-
petently conducted. That is what 
Collins calls the “experimenter’s re-
gress” (Collins 1985: 79). 
Scientific results are judged by the cri-
terion of scientific truth. So Collins’ 
experimenter’s regress can be de-
scribed as a regress of truth. From the 
scientist’s point of view truth is often 
seen to mean that a scientific state-
ment corresponds with the reality it 
describes or from with it draws gener-
alizations. In contrast, from the point 
of view of the social scientist as ob-
server of science true scientific obser-
vations and generalizations are obser-
vations and generalizations that are 
commonly accepted to be true within 
the respective scientific field – for 
whatever reason (cf. Bloor 1976). How-
ever, the idea of scientific truth implies 
that contradicting scientific statements 
cannot be true at the same time. Thus, 
the occurrence of contradicting scien-
tific claims raises the need to decide 
between them. For this reason the in-
terpretative flexibility of experiments 
and experimental results leads to sci-
entific controversies. Solving a scien-
tific controversy means to exclude, 
over time, all but one of the different 
interpretations of the initial situation 
of interpretative flexibility. Since it 
does not work to refer to experiments 
as the normal way of scientific decision 
making in situations of interpretative 
flexibility and since already established 
scientific knowledge does not help ei-
ther, social negotiation is the only way 
to come to a solution. Collins calls this 
the process of closure of a scientific 
controversy. The central actors of this 
closure processes are the scientists 
directly involved in the particular re-
search area. Collins calls them the 
“core set” of the controversy (cf. 
Collins 1983: 95). 
Collins’ most elaborate example of a 
scientific controversy and the underly-
ing interpretative flexibility is the 
search for gravitational waves. Gravita-
tional wave is the name for a physical 
phenomenon which could be described 
as a marginal, short-term shift in the 
structure of space. This shift is caused 
by the movement of big masses in the 
universe and is a theoretical result 
from Albert Einstein’s general theory 
of relativity. An experimental proof of 
the existence of gravitational waves 
would therefore be seen as empirical 
evidence for Einstein’s theory. In 1969 
Joseph Weber, Professor at the Uni-
versity of Maryland, claimed that he 
had detected gravitational waves with a 
detector he had invented himself.  
Figure 2: Diagram of Weber’s De-
tector (cf. Collins 2004: 53) 
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However, there was a significant dif-
ference between his interpretation of 
his experimental results and what, 
until then, had been inferred theoreti-
cally. The amount of gravitational 
waves he claimed to have detected was 
too large to fit into the established 
knowledge about the structure of the 
universe. In terms of established 
knowledge this amount of gravitational 
waves implies a dynamic that would 
incinerate the universe in a relatively 
short period of time (cf. Collins/Pinch 
1993). 
In the following years, groups from 
different research institutes tried to 
replicate Weber’s experiments. But 
nobody managed to detect gravita-
tional waves. Weber’s critics saw this 
as proof for errors in Weber’s experi-
ment. They concluded that his data 
was wrong. Weber, on the other side, 
saw his colleagues’ failure to detect 
gravitational waves as a proof that they 
did not manage to build a working de-
tector with the same sensitivity as his 
own.  
Several research groups published 
their results, but their articles simply 
pointed out that they could not detect 
anything. They did not conclude that 
Weber must have been wrong; at least 
they did not assert this explicitly. As 
more and more groups failed to detect 
waves, the climate gradually changed 
and the scepticism regarding Weber’ 
findings increased. Collins argues that 
the crucial change in the scientific 
community’s opinion was caused by an 
article, which lacked new scientific 
findings. This article was special not 
because of what it said, but how it was 
said. The rhetoric was very different to 
all the articles previously published on 
this subject. The author directly at-
tacked Weber and his research, claim-
ing Weber to be absolutely wrong. 
Later, an assistant to Garwin, the au-
thor of this article, explained, what had 
happened: “At that point it was not 
doing physics any longer. [..] We just 
wanted to see if it was possible to stop 
it immediately without having it drag 
on for twenty years” (Collins/Pinch 
1993: 134). 
Collins regards this as the central ele-
ment in the social closure of the inter-
pretative flexibility in Weber’s re-
search. At last, in 1975, the scientific 
community, the core set, agreed that 
Weber was wrong and his experiments 
had been incorrect. The controversy 
had been closed. 
3 The Regress of Usefulness 
Assuming basic similarities between 
the social construction of scientific 
facts and the social construction of 
technological artefacts, Trevor Pinch 
and Wiebe Bijker have applied the 
main concepts of the EPOR to the so-
cial study of technology (cf. 
Pinch/Bijker 1984; Pinch/Bijker 1987). 
In their programme of Social Con-
struction of Technology (SCOT), inter-
pretative flexibility denotes that fun-
damentally different meanings can be 
attached to the same technological 
artefact (cf. Pinch 1996: 24). Persons, 
who share the same interpretation of a 
certain technological artefact and 
thereby influence the development of 
this artefact, are referred to by Pinch 
and Bijker as a relevant social group. 
In SCOT, these relevant social groups 
taken together are equivalent to the 
scientists within the core set of a scien-
tific controversy in EPOR. They build 
the constellation of actors within which 
the social negotiation and reduction of 
interpretative flexibility takes place. 
Additionally, SCOT adopts from EPOR 
the assumption that interpretative 
flexibility does not persist. “What one 
observes is that closure and stabilisa-
tion occur in such a way that some 
artefacts appear to have fewer prob-
lems and become increasingly the 
dominant form of the technology. This, 
it should be noted, may not lead to all 
rivals vanishing, and often two very 
different technologies may exist side by 
side (for example, jet planes and pro-
peller planes).” (Pinch 1996: 25) In 
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Pinch and Bijker’s opinion, the proc-
esses of closure have the same struc-
ture as in scientific controversies: The 
proponents of the different interpreta-
tions seek to establish their own to be 
the most convincing view. Some at-
tempts to influence other relevant so-
cials group’s interpretations are more 
successful than others. In this process 
a certain interpretation becomes ac-
cepted by more and more relevant so-
cial groups and eventually leads to a 
certain technological artefact becoming 
seen as the appropriate solution to a 
certain problem by most of them. What 
gravitational waves are to Collins, bicy-
cles are to Pinch and Bijker. They use 
the history of bicycle development to 
illustrate their concept: “The high-
wheeler had the meaning of the ‘macho 
machine’ for young men of means and 
nerve, but for older people and women 
it had the radically different meaning 
of the ‘unsafe machine’. Such interpre-
tative flexibility may apply not only to 
a compound artefact but also to some 
components of it. For example, when 
the air-tyre was first introduced, it was 
for some groups an object of derision, 
aesthetically unappealing, and a source 
of endless trouble (punctures). On the 
other hand, for Dunlop it was the per-
fect solution to the problem posed by 
the vibrations of the bicycle.” (Pinch 
1996: 24-25) In this case, the closure of 
the debate results from redefining the 
problem: The high-wheeler literally 
lost the race, when the air tyres, which 
were originally developed to make 
bikes safer, proved to be a crucial fac-
tor to high speed in races. Even users 
of the macho machine preferred safe 
riding and winning over risky riding 
and losing. 
We feel that the SCOT programme is 
less convincing than it could be. Its 
central concepts – interpretative flexi-
bility, relevant social groups and clo-
sure – are defined less precisely than 
the corresponding concepts of the 
EPOR because they do not reflect phe-
nomena that are specific to the process 
of technology development. The obser-
vation that certain objects or artefacts 
may have different meanings for dif-
ferent people and that this may lead to 
disputes about who is right and who is 
wrong holds for any object or artefact 
without an already established mean-
ing and is in no way specific to techno-
logical artefacts. Defining interpreta-
tive flexibility by pointing at the differ-
ent meanings a technological artefact 
from the point of view different social 
groups may have is nothing more than 
to define interpretative flexibility by 
referring to interpretative flexibility. 
We need a narrower and more specific 
concept of interpretative flexibility of 
technological artefacts, one which 
takes into consideration the particular 
features of technology. In scientific 
controversies, the regress of truth is 
accountable for the specific form of 
interpretative flexibility of scientific 
claims. Thus, we have to look for a re-
gress, which in a similar way, is ac-
countable for a specific form of inter-
pretative flexibility of technological 
artefacts. In our opinion, such a re-
gress indeed exists. We call it the re-
gress of usefulness. We reach to this 
conclusion by referring to the basic 
characteristic that distinguishes tech-
nological artefacts from scientific find-
ings on the one side, and from other 
cultural artefacts on the other side: The 
specific technological quality of tech-
nological artefacts is that they are 
meant to produce desired effects suffi-
ciently, reliably, and in a repeatable 
way, effects which would not be possi-
ble or would require more effort with-
out the artefacts (cf. Schulz-Schaeffer 
1999: 410). From this, it follows that 
the criterion for judging technological 
artefacts is their usefulness for a cer-
tain purpose, as truth is the criterion 
for scientific facts. 
Consequently, interpretative flexibility 
of technological artefacts as far as their 
specific technological quality is con-
cerned is interpretative flexibility with 
regard to usefulness. It occurs when 
there are different possible answers to 
the question whether a technological 
artefact with its particular functional 
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features will be useful and how, for 
whom and, in which context this will or 
will not be the case. Thus, the reason 
for interpretative flexibility of techno-
logical artefacts to occur is that de-
pending on the respective purposes of 
different groups of users and depend-
ing on the diverse requirements of dif-
ferent contexts of use these questions 
of usefulness can be answered differ-
ently. Interpretative flexibility of this 
kind also has its roots in an infinite 
regress: Whether a certain technologi-
cal artefact possesses useful functional 
features will become clear only after it 
has found its users and has been im-
plemented successfully in certain con-
texts of use. Yet, the decisions regard-
ing the design of the technological ar-
tefact and its particular functional fea-
tures have to be made before it can be 
used. This is what we the regress of 
usefulness. 
Conceiving interpretative flexibility of 
technological artefacts as related to 
usefulness allows us see a similarity 
and a difference to the interpretive 
flexibility of scientific facts. As well as 
in scientific research there are cases of 
technology development where inter-
pretative flexibility does not play a 
major part but is limited right from the 
start. In many cases it is already well 
known who the users of the artefact in 
development will be, how and for 
which purposes they will use it and 
what the contexts of use will be. Espe-
cially, this is the case when the new 
technological artefact is supposed to 
become the successor of an already 
exiting artefact or when the develop-
ment process aims at enhancing an 
existing artefact. This is similar to the 
normal way of scientific research 
where the already accepted and (for 
the time being) undisputed scientific 
knowledge limits the range within 
which the data can be interpreted dif-
ferently.  
However, when interpretative flexibil-
ity becomes relevant, a major differ-
ence between scientific research and 
technology development has to be 
taken into account, a difference the 
SCOT lacks to notice: Interpretative 
flexibility of experiments and experi-
mental results inevitably causes scien-
tific controversies as long as the pro-
ponents of the different interpretations 
agree that contradicting scientific 
claims cannot be true at the same time. 
In contrast, for technological artefacts 
such a basic necessity to discuss diver-
gent interpretations controversially 
does not exist. In principle, there is no 
reason why users should agree on what 
purposes a technological artefact shall 
serve and no reason why alternative 
technological solutions serving the 
same purpose should not be developed. 
Thus, while interpretative flexibility of 
truth necessarily evokes controversies, 
interpretative flexibility of usefulness 
does not. And while scientific contro-
versies are aimed at closing the debate 
sooner or later, closure is not a neces-
sary feature of debates concerning dif-
ferent meanings of technological arte-
facts. Sometimes, however, technologi-
cal controversies occur that seem to be 
similar to their scientific counterparts. 
As we will see later (part 5.1, (3)), this 
is because the underlying interpreta-
tive flexibility, then, is related to truth 
and not to usefulness. 
4 The Regress of Relevance 
A third form of interpretative flexibility 
appears in debates about different fu-
ture directions of scientific research or 
of technological development. Inter-
pretative flexibility here means that 
because no undisputed point of view 
exists, it is possible to take up different 
positions regarding the question of 
which research approach or project of 
technology development is promising 
and which one will lead to a dead end. 
Under the condition of limited re-
sources, i.e. under the condition that 
not each of the possible approaches of 
research or development can be 
adopted, questions of this kind lead 
into controversies which need to be 
closed. However, under this condition 
the attempt to answer these questions 
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leads to an infinite regress as well. As a 
one best way solution, the most prom-
ising alternative research or develop-
ment approaches should get the most 
resources. But which criterion allows 
one to judge, which of the research 
approaches or development projects 
competing for funding will deliver 
fruitful results and thus deeming them 
promising than others?  
Since these future events are unknown 
the interested parties will try to predict 
them based on contemporary available 
research and testing results. Some-
times there is little doubt among the 
actors involved in which direction of 
future progress the existing state of the 
art points. But sometimes the contem-
porary scientific or technological 
knowledge turns out to be ambiguous 
in this respect. This is the case when 
the scientific or technological knowl-
edge available relies on scientific 
methods or technological tests, which 
had been developed to specifically 
evaluate progress in one of the ap-
proaches under investigation. Then, it 
is most likely that the respective meth-
ods or tests will show better results for 
the approach it was originally designed 
for. –Lines of technological develop-
ment are usually connected to corre-
sponding modes of testing. And each 
mode of testing focuses on criteria, 
which are essential for exactly the line 
of development, it is supposed to 
evaluate. As a consequence, certain 
technologies and the corresponding 
tests are mutually reinforcing (Con-
stant 1980: 22). The same mechanism 
can be shown for different scientific 
approaches and the corresponding 
experimental methods. 
So, for deciding, which of the different 
approaches is more promising, propo-
nents of a certain approach use tests 
and the corresponding evaluation cri-
teria, which are consistent with their 
favoured approach. And of course, 
each side – by using their own evalua-
tion criteria – will find prove, that the 
approach, they are advocating is the 
most promising one. At the same time, 
each side will question the relevance of 
the evaluation criteria of the compet-
ing approaches for predicting future 
success. The only possibility way to 
find out, which of the different criteria 
are the relevant criteria to predict fu-
ture success, would be to compare the 
results of each endeavour. But the rea-
son for identifying the more promising 
approach is due to resource scarcity, in 
which only one or a few of them can be 
funded. Consequently, the attempt to 
identify promising approaches of fu-
ture work in science and technology 
also leads into an infinite regress, 
which we call the regress of relevance. 
Here, the relevance of available test or 
research results with respect to the 
question, whether or not a scientific or 
technological approach is promising, is 
subject to interpretative flexibility. 
The research on Neural Networks in 
the 1960’s provides an example for a 
controversy based on interpretative 
flexibility of relevance. Neural Net-
works were seen as a way to create 
intelligent machines by imitating the 
human brain activities. Researchers 
who followed this approach tried to 
build computational structures similar 
to the basic physiological structure of 
the brain. In contrast, Symbolic Artifi-
cial Intelligence (AI), being the main 
competing approach at the time, tried 
to identify the rules humans use when 
they are thinking. They expected to be 
able to create intelligent machines by 
programming knowledge, rules and 
reasoning procedures. Scientists of the 
Symbolic AI approach claimed that it 
would never be possible to create intel-
ligent machines based on Neural Net-
works. Marvin Minsky and Seymour 
Papert, the most prominent advocates 
of Symbolic AI, presented mathemati-
cal proofs to support this claim. No 
scientific controversy took place. The 
proponents of the Neural Network 
approach did not contest the truth of 
Minsky and Papert’s proofs. But they 
questioned the relevance of these re-
sults for the question, which of the two 
different approaches is more promis-
ing (cf. Meyer 2004: 75-79). The po-
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tential of a future direction of scientific 
research or technological development 
is contested by challenging that the 
scientific facts or technological 
achievements the proponents or oppo-
nents use to support their view are 
relevant concerning this matter. Con-
testing the potential of a future path of 
scientific research or technological 
development, thus, does not necessar-
ily mean to challenge the truth or the 
usefulness of the scientific facts or 
technological achievements used as 
arguments.  
In order to show the structure of a con-
troversy concerning relevance, we shall 
look more closely at one set of argu-
ments both sides used in the discus-
sion about Neural Networks. In 1969, 
Minsky and Papert published a book, 
entitled “Perceptrons”, where they laid 
down their arguments against the Neu-
ral Networks approach (cf. Min-
sky/Papert 1969). The cover of the 
book showed two figures, which look 
nearly identical. One of them consists 
of one single line and the other one 
consists of two lines. In their book, the 
authors presented a mathematical 
proof saying that Neural Networks 
would never be able to find out, which 
one is which.  
In addition, they offered a very simple 
algorithm from the research on Sym-
bolic AI to solve this problem. 
Rosenblatt, one of the most prominent 
proponents of the Neural Networks 
approach agreed with their interpreta-
tion. But he also pointed out, that in 
his perspective, these results where 
completely irrelevant for analysing the 
potential of future research on Neural 
Networks. His argument was very sim-
ple: Neural Networks are supposed to 
imitate human thinking and recogni-
tion. Even with these very simple fig-
ures, humans are hardly able to distin-
guish, which of the two is connected 
and which is not. If humans are not 
able to do this, machines which are 
supposed to imitate humans do not 
have to be able to do it either (cf. 
Meyer 2004: 77-78). So the evaluation 
criteria for the two different ap-
proaches varied, depending on which 
of the two approaches was preferred. 
Proponents of Neural Networks used 
evaluation criteria which where consis-
tent with their sub symbolic concept of 
Artificial Intelligence, proponents of 
Symbolic AI used criteria, which com-
plied with there concept of rule-based 
Artificial Intelligence. 
Figure 3: Cover of “Perceptrons” 
(cf. Minsky/Papert 1969) 
 
But in spite of Rosenblatt’s criticism on 
their evaluation criteria, Minsky and 
Papert successfully established their 
view concerning the relevance of these 
facts until the end of the 1960’s. They 
managed to convince the main funding 
organisations that supporting the 
Symbolic AI approach would be much 
more promising than funding research 
on Neural Networks. They skilfully 
used their personal contacts within 
these funding organisations. They also 
focused their critique of the Neural 
Networks approach on problems which 
could be easily solved by means of 
Symbolic AI. The problem of connect-
edness was one of them. In the end of 
the 1950’s a few hundred groups did 
research on Neural Networks. Ten 
years later, this number was reduced to 
just a few projects. These projects had 
to ‘hide’ in other research areas, be-
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cause at this time it was not possible to 
get direct funding of research on Neu-
ral Networks. The controversy was 
closed. 
5 The Empirical Relevance of 
Distinguishing between 
Three Forms of Interpreta-
tive Flexibility 
The case of Neural Networks reveals 
that controversies in science can be 
based on interpretative flexibility of 
relevance instead of interpretative 
flexibility of truth. We will show in the 
following sections that interpretative 
flexibility of usefulness can also play an 
important part in interpreting science. 
In addition to that, we will also show 
that all three forms of interpretive 
flexibility can account for different 
meanings of technological artefacts. 
Interpretation processes that started as 
controversies about the truth of facts 
can be ended as decisions concerning 
questions of usefulness or relevance, 
and vice versa. The proposed distinc-
tion between three forms of interpreta-
tive flexibility allows for a more de-
tailed analysis of these mixtures and 
transformations. As we hope to have 
shown in the previous sections, with 
each of the three forms, different ways 
to handle interpretative flexibility are 
connected. Therefore, it is important to 
distinguish between them for analysing 
the social construction of scientific 
facts and technological artefacts, espe-
cially in cases where more than one 
form of interpretative flexibility occurs. 
In the following section, we will elabo-
rate on the thesis that interpretation of 
scientific facts or technological arte-
facts may contain different forms of 
interpretative flexibility at the same 
time or one after another. First we will 
present three general observations. 
After that we will use the classical ex-
amples of SCOT and EPOR to show, 
how our concept allows a more de-
tailed analysis of the processes, which 
led to the closure of these controver-
sies. 
5.1 Three General Observations 
(1) The concept of paradigm shift, i.e. 
the replacement of an established 
paradigm by a new, but not yet very 
elaborate one, was presented by Tho-
mas S. Kuhn (1962) for the scientific 
realm and adapted by Giovanni Dosi 
(1982) for technology. On a very high 
level of abstraction, these concepts 
describe a shift from reference to truth 
or usefulness to reference to relevance. 
If disputes in science between an es-
tablished and a new and still evolving 
paradigm would be controversies re-
lated to truth and if the corresponding 
disputes in technology would refer to 
usefulness, the established paradigm 
would always win. If a new paradigm 
prevails against an old one, it is be-
cause of the future scientific or techno-
logical innovations it is expected to 
bring about. A new paradigm cannot 
prove the truth of its scientific assump-
tions or the usefulness of its envisioned 
technological solutions as good as an 
established paradigm can. This is 
something that will or will not be dem-
onstrated by “normal science” and 
“normal technology development” 
within the frame of reference of this 
paradigm, work that in contrast to the 
competing established paradigm still 
lies ahead. A new paradigm is attrac-
tive because it seems to be more prom-
ising for solving scientific or techno-
logical problems in the future. 
(2) Controversies concerning truth can 
be transformed into questions of use-
fulness. This can be observed when 
closure in a scientific controversy is 
not to be expected in the near future or 
when a controversy is regarded to be 
unsolvable. The question whether it is 
possible to perceive reality in itself or 
whether every perception of reality 
depends on the observer’s point of 
view is an example of a scientific prob-
lem many scientists assume to be un-
solvable. Thus, in giving reasons for 
assuming a more epistemologically 
realistic or constructivist position, sci-
entists tend to shift from truth-related 
arguments to arguments of usefulness. 
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This is how Hartmut Esser and Niklas 
Luhmann support their different point 
of view. Both agree that the basic epis-
temological problem is unsolvable (cf. 
Esser 1993: 53; Luhmann 1990: 531). 
However, both explicitly argue their 
position to be the more useful one. 
Esser’s reason for a more realistic posi-
tion is that epistemological realism is 
the simpler hypothesis (cf. Esser 1993: 
54, 56). According to Luhmann scien-
tific theories, on the contrary, should 
allow for a high resolution of the ob-
served phenomena (cf. Luhmann 1990: 
510). Accordingly, he sees the con-
structivist position as more useful 
since it provides a reflexive theory 
adequate for the complexity of the 
modern society (cf. Luhmann 1990: 
531). 
Thus, in transforming scientific con-
troversies into different interpretations 
concerning the usefulness of scientific 
positions it becomes a question of pur-
pose and context which position is 
more adequate. 
(3) On the other side, differences in the 
interpretation of the usefulness of 
technological artefacts can be trans-
formed into scientific controversies. 
This can be achieved by transforming 
the subject of interpretative flexibility 
– for example the question whether a 
particular functional feature of a tech-
nological artefact is useful within a 
certain context of use – into a subject 
of empirical scientific research. Donald 
MacKenzie (1989: 411) calls this “pro-
ducing facts about artifacts”. The proc-
ess, which does the magic, is called 
testing. Testing technology means 
checking hypotheses about the useful-
ness of certain properties of an artifact 
in a scientifically controlled, empirical 
way (Constant 1980: 21). It transforms 
differences in the interpretation of 
usefulness into technological contro-
versies. Technological controversies 
are controversies about the truth (!) of 
hypotheses about usefulness. Or to say 
it in MacKenzie’s word again: “all the 
issues that recent sociology of science 
has raised about experiment in science 
can be raised about testing in technol-
ogy” (MacKenzie 1989: 411). 
MacKenzie puts emphasis on the fact, 
that there is a tester’s regress which is 
analogous to the Collins’ experi-
menter’s regress (cf. MacKenzie 1989: 
424). He is right because the tester’s 
regress as well as the experimenter’s 
regress is a regress of truth. 
5.2 Interpretative Flexibility of 
Relevance and the Contro-
versy of Gravitational Waves 
In the 1980’s, the gravitational waves 
controversy was reopened, turning into 
a controversy related to relevance. In 
1982, about seven years after the clo-
sure of the controversy described 
above, Weber published new results. 
He claimed to have found the explana-
tion as to why his measuring apparatus 
had been able to detect gravitational 
waves. Following his argument, he had 
not detected the huge amount of gravi-
tational waves, which he thought he 
had and which did not correspond with 
the scientific consensus. Instead, his 
apparatus was vastly more sensitive 
than previously assumed.  
Figure 4: A Weber Bar  
(cf. Collins 2004) 
 
Based on his new theory, Weber calcu-
lated the sensitivity of his sensor to be 
one million to one billion times higher 
than he had thought. As a conse-
quence, the detected gravitational 
waves intensity would be a million to a 
billion times smaller than calculated. 
This would mean no conflict exists 
between the data and the established 
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theories regarding the structure of the 
universe. Weber explained his new 
estimation of the sensitivity of his with 
a specific characteristic of the metal 
bars he uses as detectors He argued 
that in order to properly describe how 
the metal bars inner structure re-
sponds to gravitational waves, quan-
tum theory must be applied. The quan-
tum-theoretical effects, which Weber 
assumed to be active in his bars, 
caused the higher sensitivity to gravita-
tional waves.  
Weber published this line of argument 
at first in 1982 in the journal Physical 
Review. This paper was ignored by the 
scientific community. After the closure 
to the controversy in the mid-1970’s, 
this was the usual reaction to Weber’s 
publications. The controversy was 
closed, further discussion was not nec-
essary. The scientific community’s ex-
clusion mechanisms worked well (cf. 
Collins 2004: 364-366). However, af-
ter he had published in 1989 another 
article on the same topic his line of 
argument became massively criticized 
by established researchers in the field. 
Although this article was published in 
a smaller journal (Il Nuovo Cimento) 
and contained no new arguments, the 
scientists reacted to this article. What 
had happened?  
Research Institutes at MIT had devel-
oped a new technology for detecting 
gravitational waves. Based on lasers, 
this technology was expected to be 
much more sensitive than the metal 
bars. 
The newly contrived detector consists 
of two laser measurement sections, 
which where positioned orthogonally 
to each other. With the help of the la-
sers, the exact length of the section is 
measured at every given moment. If a 
gravitational wave hits this detector, 
the lengths of the detector’s two “arms” 
change. This change is different in each 
of the detector’s “arms,” depending on 
the angle in which the gravitational 
waves hit the detector. This change in 
the relation of the length can be meas-
ured and serves as a proof of gravita-
tional waves. Around the world, a few 
of these detectors where planned. The 
biggest two, the Laser Interferometer 
Gravitational Observatories (LIGO), 
were planned for construction in the 
USA. For each of the arms, the laser 
measurement section measures a 
length of 4 km. 
The costs for building these facilities 
were an estimated 300 million dollars. 
The US government was expected to 
fund this project. At this time, when 
the negotiations over LIGO funding 
were taking place, Weber renewed his 
claims about being able to detect gravi-
tational waves using a much cheaper 
and more sensitive apparatus than 
LIGO. In addition to the article from 
1989, Weber wrote numerous letters to 
Figure 5: LIGO (cf. Collins 2004) 
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the decision makers of the funding of 
LIGO. In these letters he accused the 
LIGO-Project to be an enormous waste 
of tax money compared to his own 
measuring apparatus. (cf. Collins 
2004: 360-361). By doing this, he tried 
to involve actors into the debate which 
were not part of the core set of the sci-
entific controversy regarding gravity 
waves. Thus, Weber transformed the 
controversy about scientific truth 
which he had already lost into a con-
troversy about the relevance of alterna-
tive research directions of detecting 
gravity waves. This explains the harsh 
reaction to his paper from 1989. His 
new arguments and the opponents’ 
responses did not revive the scientific 
controversy. This controversy re-
mained closed. Weber’s findings were 
not treated as worthy to be discussed 
scientifically. Weber argued, that, 
based on his evaluation criteria, his 
approach was more suitable to meas-
ure gravitational waves – because of 
the quantum-effects within his bars – 
and much cheaper than laser-based 
experiments. His opponents did not 
agree on his criteria. For them, his 
argument based on quantum theory 
was pure nonsense. From their point of 
view Weber’s bars where not able to 
measure gravitational waves at all and 
– as a consequence – his cost-
argument was insignificant. 
So, the goal of Weber’s opponents was 
to show the decision makers of the 
funding organisations that Weber and 
his work should not be seen as belong-
ing to the core of research on gravity 
waves, that is view was not shared by 
anybody within the scientific commu-
nity and, thus, that his objections con-
cerning the relevance of their new re-
search approach should not be taken 
seriously. 
5.3 Interpretative Flexibility of 
Truth and the Development 
of the Bicycle 
The reconstruction of the bicycle de-
velopment, as Pinch and Bijker provide 
it, includes an episode where interpre-
tative flexibility of usefulness becomes 
transformed into truth-related hy-
potheses about usefulness. According 
to Pinch and Bijker, the safety bicycle’s 
victory over the high-wheeler was a 
victory captured in bicycles races. The 
success of the safety bicycles in these 
races were seen as a proof that their air 
tyres have a better performance with 
respect to the purpose of riding as fast 
as possible than the solid tyres of the 
high-wheeler. Thus, these bicycle races 
provided a situation of testing the 
functional feature “air tyre” against 
alternative solutions to the speed prob-
lem. Admittedly, it is not a very scien-
tific sort of testing, but it is testing. 
According to the reconstruction by 
Pinch and Bijker, these races resulted 
in the safety bicycle being superior 
became widely accepted as true. Scien-
tific controversies occur because of 
interpretative flexibility of experimen-
tal results. In the same way, these test-
ing results could have become the sub-
ject of a technological controversy. In 
both cases the underlying problem is 
or would be the regress of truth. There 
would have been plenty of opportuni-
ties for the advocates of the high-
wheeler to question the validity of the 
bicycle races as tests. An overview over 
possible reasons for challenging the 
results of tests is given by MacKenzie 
(1989: 413-414). Critics could have 
argued “that existing cycle races were 
not appropriate tests for a cycle’s ‘real’ 
speed (after all, the idealized world of 
the race track may not match everyday 
road conditions, any more than the 
Formula-1 racing car bears on the per-
formance requirements of the average 
family sedan)” (Pinch/Bijker 1987: 46). 
They could have argued that it is not 
the average speed of the race, but the 
maximum speed which is important or 
that the race proves the superiority of 
the air tyres, but does not reflect the 
superiority of the low-wheeler and so 
on. Arguments of this kind illustrate 
that technological controversies are 
about truth-related issues. McKenzie’s 
analysis of the technological contro-
versy about the accuracy of interconti-
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nental missiles shows this very clearly. 
According to Pinch and Bijker, the 
proponents of the high-wheeler for-
went the option to start a technological 
controversy. They simply accepted the 
test results. The bicycle races trans-
formed a situation of contested useful-
ness into a situation in which it would 
be now a question of truth to challenge 
the claimed superiority of the air tyres. 
Since nobody started a technological 
controversy about this issue, the trans-
formation immediately led to a closure 
of the debate. 
5.4 Interpretative Flexibility of 
Usefulness and the Contro-
versy of Neural Networks 
The case of Neural Networks serves as 
an example of a controversy about 
relevance that revived but took a new 
direction after questions of usefulness 
were included. Especially in the 1980’s, 
the discussion about the usefulness of 
certain methods became crucial for the 
outcome of the renewed debate. A dis-
tinguishing feature of this controversy 
is that after the debate was closed in 
the late 1960’s, it was reopened at the 
beginning of the 1980’s. Many of the 
same actors used mostly the same ar-
guments to debate whether Neural 
Networks or Symbolic AI is the more 
promising approach. But this time, the 
result was completely different. The 
research on Neural Networks, which 
was announced to be of no avail in the 
late 1960s, experienced a furious re-
vival. By the end of the 1980’s, it be-
came an established and well funded 
part of the research on artificial intelli-
gence. This is due to more than one 
reason (cf. Meyer 2004: 97-107). How-
ever, one central aspect was that the 
controversy was enlarged by the ques-
tion of the usefulness of specific prod-
ucts resulting from the research on 
Neural Networks compared to research 
on Symbolic AI. 
As indicated above, though having lost 
the controversy of the 1960’s, some 
Neural Networks research groups were 
able to survive by “hiding” in other 
scientific disciplines like biology and 
physics. Due to the work they con-
ducted there, these groups presented 
first applications for Neural Networks 
in the 1980’s. In 1987, it was a sensa-
tion, when a computer program was 
presented, completely based on Neural 
Networks that was able to transform 
written text in spoken language. Based 
on successes like this, proponents of 
Neural Networks tried to shift the fo-
cus of the controversy. Instead of a 
theoretical discussion about the long-
term prospects of Neural Networks 
research, like in the 1960’s, they pro-
moted a debate concerning the useful-
ness of certain existing solutions to 
problems. Of course, they focused on 
topics which proved problematic for 
Symbolic AI, e.g. pattern recognition. 
As a response to this attempt to reopen 
the controversy, Minsky and Papert 
republished their book “Perceptrons.” 
(cf. Minsky/Papert 1988) Because it 
worked so well then, they just added a 
new introduction, extended the final 
chapter, and left the rest of the book as 
it was. They wanted to show that their 
mathematical proofs still support their 
assessment of the nearly non-existing 
potential of Neural Networks. Thus, 
Minsky and Papert tried to force the 
revived controversy into the direction 
that in the 1960’s had proven to be 
successful in promoting their research 
approach They argued that all solu-
tions presented by Neural Networks 
research still rely on overly simplified 
models which are also subject to the 
restrictions they claimed to have dem-
onstrated in their book. Applied to the 
complexity of the real world, they 
would fail to keep up with the promises 
of their creators. Because Neural Net-
work research was located in research 
areas different from computer science 
and due to the availability of first ap-
plications that demonstrated their use-
fulness, these theoretical arguments 
could not develop the power they had 
20 years before. Minsky and Papert 
lost the debate concerning the useful-
ness of the Neural Networks approach 
because they focused their argumenta-
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tion on the level of theoretical long 
term evaluation. Their opponents, on 
the other side, connected concrete 
problems with concrete solutions. In 
doing so, they where able to establish 
their perspective of the usefulness of 
Neural Networks. Consequently, re-
search on Neural Networks became an 
attractive research option for scientists 
in the field of Artificial Intelligence as 
well as for funding organisations. 
6 Conclusion 
The concept of three forms of interpre-
tative flexibility (3FiF) as presented 
here relies on two strands of argumen-
tation. First, by tracing back interpre-
tative flexibility to three different 
forms of infinite regress, we focus on 
differences between phenomena re-
lated to interpretative flexibility. Sec-
ond, we wanted to show that in contro-
versies or debates concerning the 
meaning of a certain scientific fact, 
technological artefact or research ap-
proach, concurrently or consecutively 
different forms of interpretative flexi-
bility may play a part. Combining and 
extending previous considerations re-
garding interpretative flexibility in this 
way serves two objectives: we hope 
that in identifying differences in inter-
pretative flexibility and corresponding 
differences in handling interpretative 
flexibility, we will contribute to a better 
theoretical understanding of the dy-
namics of the social construction of 
scientific facts and technological arte-
facts Additionally, we are confident 
that our approach is useful for empiri-
cally analysing the course of develop-
ment of scientific or technological con-
troversies in a more appropriate way. 
Shifts between and transformations of 
the respective reason of interpretative 
flexibility (contested truth, contested 
usefulness, contested relevance) be-
come observable as well as situations 
of their coexistence. This helps to ex-
plain why closure in debates about the 
meaning of technological artefacts oc-
cur although there is no inherent need 
to come to an agreement; why on the 
other hand scientific controversies 
remain open although, here, an im-
perative to closure exists; how scien-
tific controversies become closed for 
other than truth-related reasons; or 
why, as in the case of Neural Networks, 
an already closed controversy becomes 
reopened again. 
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